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EXECUTIVE POWER, DRONE EXECUTIONS,
AND THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
OF AMERICAN CITIZENS
Jonathan G. D’Errico*
Few conflicts have tested the mettle of procedural due process more than
the War on Terror. Although fiery military responses have insulated the
United States from another 9/11, the Obama administration’s 2011 drone
execution of a U.S. citizen allegedly associated with al-Qaeda without formal
charges or prosecution sparked public outrage. Judicial recognition that
this nonbattlefield execution presented a plausible procedural due process
claim ignited questions which continue to smolder today: What are the limits
of executive war power? What constitutional privileges do American citizens
truly retain in the War on Terror? What if the executive erred in its judgment
and mistakenly executed an innocent citizen?
Currently, no legal regime provides answers or guards against the
infringement of procedural due process the next time the executive
determines that an American citizen must be executed to protect the borders
of the United States. The executive remains free to unilaterally target and
execute an American citizen via drone strike without the formal process that
typically accompanies a death sentence under U.S. law. Protected under the
aegis of national security, executive discretion has trumped the procedural
due process rights of American citizens.
To contextualize these issues of presidential power and procedural due
process, this Note first surveys the modern War on Terror by examining the
statutory authority enabling drone strikes and the scope of executive warmaking powers. Next, this Note employs the balancing test devised by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to assess the due process
afforded a citizen targeted for extrajudicial drone execution under the
executive’s unilateral methodology. Two potential safeguards—ex post and
ex ante judicial review of drone strikes—are examined as possible defenses
against the unjustified execution of an American citizen.
After comparing these two systems of judicial review, this Note details and
advocates for the congressional implementation of a narrowly tailored ex
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.M., 2013, New York
University. Thank you to my wife for her unwavering love and support, my family for their
continual encouragement, Amanda Gottlieb for her gracious guidance, Professor Tracy
Higgins for her sage advice and direction, and the editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review
for their hard work and phenomenal editing expertise.
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ante schema to provide an additional layer of process and reduce the risk of
an unfounded drone execution. By lowering the likelihood of an erroneous
execution, this precise ex ante legal regime strives to fulfill the procedural
due process requirements delineated in Mathews v. Eldridge. This finely
tailored ex ante regime mitigates executive discretion while still bending to
meet the onerous demands of national security imposed in the modern age of
terror.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2011, the Obama administration employed a targeted drone
strike to covertly execute Anwar al-Aulaqi in Yemen.1 Anwar al-Aulaqi was
born in the United States, rose to notoriety as a fiery preacher of violent jihad,
and purportedly joined the ranks of al-Qaeda.2 Aulaqi’s prolific YouTube
sermons endorsing acts of terror connected him with numerous jihadists.3
Despite a large body of public evidence connecting Aulaqi to violent
extremist positions and acts of terrorism,4 he was executed as a suspected
terrorist outside an active combat zone without ever being formally charged,
convicted, or detained in connection with plotting or assisting a terrorist
attack.5 At the time of Aulaqi’s execution, Yemen was not a formal
battleground for U.S. armed forces.6 The U.S. government refused to
produce specific evidence linking Aulaqi to al-Qaeda to prevent the
dissemination of alleged “state secrets” that could jeopardize national
security.7 Aulaqi’s death at the hands of the Obama administration marks
the first time since the Civil War that the U.S. government publicly
acknowledged the execution of an American citizen as an enemy combatant
without a trial.8
Although conspicuously absent from Aulaqi’s case, formal prosecutions,
trials, and convictions are all examples of the procedural due process
guaranteed to U.S. citizens by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.9
This constitutional safeguard is infringed when the federal government
intentionally deprives a citizen of life, liberty, or property without the
1. Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in
America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/
world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html
[https://perma.cc/9R95-ZXFA].
2. Id.
3. See Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html
[https://perma.cc/AAJ6-R4AR].
4. In a February 2010 interview, Aulaqi called for jihad against America, praised the
actions of the Christmas Day bomber and the Fort Hood shooter, and implored others to follow
in their footsteps. See Interview: Anwar al-Awlaki, AL-JAZEERA (Feb. 7, 2010),
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/02/2010271074776870.html [https://perma.cc/893YWZ3K]. Aulaqi founded the al-Qaeda publication Inspire and frequently contributed articles
advocating for assassinations, bombings, and other attacks against Western targets. Ian Black,
Inspire Magazine: The Self-Help Manual for al-Qaida Terrorists, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/may/24/inspire-magazine-self-helpmanual-al-qaida-terrorists [https://perma.cc/7W9R-HBRJ]; see also Shane, supra note 3
(referencing Aulaqi’s “digital legacy” of YouTube sermons advocating for war against the
West).
5. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama (Aulaqi I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010).
6. See Shane, supra note 3.
7. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta (Aulaqi II), 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 64, 80–81 (D.D.C. 2014); Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 40, 45, Aulaqi I, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 10-cv-01469),
2010 WL 4974323, at *14.
8. Mazzetti, Savage & Shane, supra note 1.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no American shall “be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law”).
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sufficient procedural protection demanded by the particular situation.10 The
complete absence of formal process afforded Aulaqi prior to his execution
was recognized in a 2014 decision from the District Court for the District of
Columbia, which found that Aulaqi’s death presented a “plausible”
procedural due process claim.11
In July 2010, before any litigation concerning Aulaqi arose and over a year
prior to his execution, the Department of Justice (DOJ) concluded in a
classified internal memo that the executive could unilaterally execute Aulaqi
without infringing upon his Fifth Amendment due process rights.12 In
coming to this conclusion, the DOJ referenced a test devised by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge13 to assess the appropriate measure
of due process mandated by the Fifth Amendment.14 This fact-specific
balancing test weighs: (1) the citizen’s interest in life, liberty, or property
affected by the official action; (2) the government’s interest in carrying out
the official action; (3) the possibility that the official action erroneously
deprived the citizen’s life, liberty, or property; and (4) the potential benefit
of implementing additional safeguards.15 This framework evaluates
government procedures to ensure adequate process accompanies official
actions that affect a private citizen’s life, liberty, or property.16 While this
memorandum (the “DOJ White Memo”) briefly acknowledged the risk of an
unfounded drone strike, it never considered Aulaqi’s life interest nor
10. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005) (holding that an
individual’s entitlement to due process protection must be closely and concretely tied to a life,
liberty, or property interest); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (asserting that the
Due Process Clause does not protect against an injury caused by negligent conduct);
O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 789 (1980) (recognizing that due
process protection does not extend to “indirect adverse effects of governmental action”);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”).
11. Aulaqi II, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 73–74 (holding that the complaint stated a plausible
procedural due process claim given Aulaqi “was executed without charge, indictment, or
prosecution”). See infra notes 112–25 for a discussion of the litigation surrounding Aulaqi’s
execution.
12. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 38 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter DOJ
White
Memo],
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2014-06-23_barronmemorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF84-QZD6] (“[W]e do not believe that al-Aulaqi’s U.S.
citizenship imposes constitutional limitations that would preclude the contemplated lethal
action . . . .”). This Note will not attempt to reconcile whether it was appropriate to target
Aulaqi as an “enemy belligerent” due to the significant amount of classified information
redacted from the DOJ White Memo. Id. at 21–23. The DOJ White Memo also contains an
explanation of why Aulaqi’s execution did not violate federal statutory law or the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 1–37, 41. An analysis of the DOJ’s reasoning concerning these issues is
beyond the purview of this Note.
13. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
14. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 39.
15. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. See infra Part II for the application of this test.
Although “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” and “the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards” can be treated as a single prong of the Mathews test, this
Note will discuss each concept individually to fully flesh out the relevant analysis. See infra
Parts II.C–D.
16. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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evaluated nonlethal methods of providing additional process beyond a
“capture operation.”17
The tension between the DOJ White Memo’s greenlight to execute Aulaqi
absent formal process and subsequent judicial recognition of a plausible due
process claim demand further exploration. This Note examines the outer
limits of unilateral executive military power18 and explicitly balances all
factors of the Mathews test19 to analyze whether additional safeguards should
be implemented to protect against an unjustified execution and the
infringement of procedural due process.20 Specifically, this Note assesses
judicial review as an additional measure to safeguard against the risk of the
mistaken deprivation of life21 and advocates for implementing a narrow ex
ante methodology to review proposed drone strikes targeting American
citizens.22 This precisely tailored ex ante regime provides greater due
process and diffuses federal power without unduly burdening necessary
executive decision-making in the War on Terror.23
Part I of this Note provides an overview of drone strikes in the War on
Terror, the due process rights of U.S. citizens, and how the government’s
methodology for the drone execution of a U.S. citizen reconciles such rights.
Part I also examines the scope of the executive’s war-making authority.
Part II evaluates the procedural due process concerns underlying the
executive’s current methodology for targeting an American citizen for drone
execution. Part II.A examines the magnitude of a citizen’s life interest at
stake in a drone execution, and Part II.B discusses the government’s interest
in national security. Part II.C evaluates the risk of an unjustified execution
of an American citizen under the executive’s current methodology. Part II.D
appraises the potential benefits of implementing judicial review of drone
strikes to safeguard against an unjustified execution of an American citizen
and the infringement of procedural due process rights.
Part III advocates for the narrow implementation of ex ante judicial
review. Part III.A details the pragmatic benefits of ex ante review that would
not be present in an ex post regime. Finally, Part III.B enumerates an ex ante
methodology that provides additional process without unduly burdening the
executive.
I. A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE WAR ON TERROR
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks ignited the War on Terror.
Unconventional enemies, shocking tragedies, and urban guerilla warfare

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 40.
See infra Part I.E.
424 U.S. at 335.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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soon defined this conflict.24 Ever-changing threats have expanded this
conflict throughout the Middle East and over several presidential
administrations.25 Part I.A surveys the role of drone strikes in the War on
Terror. Part I.B examines the statutory authority enabling the executive’s
drone strikes. Part I.C details the extent of due process rights that protect
Americans even when targeted abroad under the aforementioned statutory
authority. Part I.D inspects the executive’s methodology for assessing
whether an American citizen should be targeted for drone execution. Finally,
Part I.E analyzes the breadth of the executive’s unilateral military authority
and how the political question doctrine defines the scope of this authority.
A. Mapping the Landscape of Drone Strikes
Upon taking the oath of office in 2009, President Obama inherited two
covert counterterrorism strategies developed during the Bush administration:
the black-site interrogation program and unmanned predator-drone
assassinations.26 Within forty-eight hours of assuming office, President
Obama signed an executive order prohibiting torture in accordance with
international conventions and federal law, thereby officially eliminating the
black-site interrogation program.27 Within seventy-two hours of assuming
office, President Obama ordered drone strikes in Pakistan that killed an
estimated eleven people, including up to five children.28 Not to be outdone
by his predecessor, President Trump has reportedly eliminated bureaucratic
drone regulations and expanded the scope of such attacks.29 Torture was
formally removed from the War on Terror, but drone strikes are emphatically
here to stay.30

24. See Stephanie Gaskell, How the War on Terror Changed the Way America Fights,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 1, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/how-thewar-on-terror-changed-the-way-america-fights/279250/ [https://perma.cc/YQH8-X43E].
25. Id.
26. Micah Zenko, Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/
01/12/reflecting-on-obamas-presidency/obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lastinglegacy [https://perma.cc/YM6W-28D8].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Daniel J. Rosenthal & Loren Dejonge Schulman, Trump’s Secret War on Terror,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/
trump-war-terror-drones/567218/ [https://perma.cc/88TZ-HG47].
30. Notwithstanding President Obama’s 2009 prohibition of torture, a laundry list of
human rights abuses stemming from unbridled executive discretion permeate the War on
Terror. See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012) (alleging abusive
interrogations during military detention); Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2011)
(alleging widespread warrantless eavesdropping on American citizens); El-Masri v. United
States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–02 (4th Cir. 2007) (alleging illegal detainment under the CIA
“extraordinary rendition program” and torture). See generally Memorandum from John C.
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/
yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/E796-VNJ7] (notoriously defending the
legality of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” informally known as the “Torture Memos”).
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Unmanned drone strikes provide the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
with a discrete weapon to attack targets which does not risk the lives of
American service members.31 Predator drones’ hellfire missiles target those
believed to be high-ranking members of terrorist organizations.32 In recent
years, the list of targeted groups has grown to encompass the Islamic State
and affiliated groups.33 Initially focused on targets in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Obama administration expanded the breadth of drone strikes to a variety
of noncombat theaters, such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.34 The Obama
administration not only expanded the breadth of drone strikes but also
increased the volume of targeted attacks.35 While President Bush authorized
roughly fifty drone strikes over the course of his presidency, President
Obama sanctioned over five hundred strikes.36 This ten-fold increase has
generated controversy as experts claim that 12 percent of the nearly four
thousand deaths from the Obama administration’s drone strikes were
civilians.37 While American citizens are included in the approximately 480
civilians mistakenly executed under the Obama administration, Anwar alAulaqi remains the only American citizen who the president publicly
acknowledged was intentionally targeted and executed.38 Despite the Obama
administration’s drone legacy, President Trump has reportedly indicated that
he wants the CIA to “take a more aggressive posture” with regard to drone
strikes.39
B. Killing as a Matter of Law: The Statutory Authority
for Drone Executions
The Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations relied on the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF or “the Act”) as statutory authority to

This is not a modern legacy isolated to the War on Terror. See Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
31. Scott Shane, Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable Truth: U.S. Is Often Unsure About
Who Will Die, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/
drone-strikes-reveal-uncomfortable-truth-us-is-often-unsure-about-who-will-die.html
[https://perma.cc/2KFM-S227].
32. See id.
33. Mary Louise Kelly, When the U.S. Military Strikes, White House Points to a 2001
Measure, NPR (Sept. 6, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/09/06/
492857888/when-the-u-s-military-strikes-white-house-points-to-a-2001-measure
[https://perma.cc/WSN9-RKTU].
34. Id.
35. Zenko, supra note 26.
36. Id.
37. Jeffrey S. Brand & Amos N. Guiora, Judicial Review of Planned Drone Attacks Would
Save Lives, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2015/04/24/should-a-court-approve-all-drone-strikes/judicial-review-ofplanned-drone-attacks-would-save-lives [https://perma.cc/ZS9R-V5AT].
38. Shane, supra note 31.
39. Ken Dilanian & Courtney Kube, Trump Administration Wants to Increase CIA Drone
Strikes, NBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/trump-adminwants-increase-cia-drone-strikes-n802311 [https://perma.cc/2XUR-58WK].
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conduct targeted drone executions.40 Congress expediently passed the
AUMF three days after the 9/11 attacks, which succinctly grants the president
broad authority to use any “necessary and appropriate force” against those
determined to have “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11
attacks.41 The Obama administration asserted that the AUMF also provides
authority to target ancillary groups, such as ISIS (also known as ISIL), that
are more tenuously related to the 9/11 attacks than al-Qaeda or the Taliban.42
The Trump administration’s drone policy echoes a similar—if not broader—
understanding of the AUMF’s reach.43 The authority granted by the AUMF
has no expiration date and no geographic limits—no corner of the earth is
outside the Act’s broad grant of executive killing power.44 The AUMF could
theoretically be used for drone strikes in London, Paris, or Madrid.45
The scope of the AUMF’s vague language has been consistently
challenged and refined, especially with regard to precisely who is considered
affiliated with the 9/11 attacks, the breadth of activity covered under the Act,
and the outer limits of the executive’s authority under the Act.46 Courts have
noted that determining who is covered under the AUMF, and the extent of
such coverage, is a highly challenging and nuanced fact-driven inquiry.47
The executive’s modern-day use of the AUMF to target ISIS, a group that
has actively fought al-Qaeda and did not exist when the AUMF was enacted,
is a bold display of presidential discretion that further muddied the murky
40. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)); Gene Healy & John Glaser, Opinion, Repeal, Don’t
Replace, Trump’s War Powers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/17/opinion/repeal-replace-trump-war-powers.html [https://perma.cc/N325-7B3H].
41. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224; Healy & Glaser, supra
note 40.
42. Kelly, supra note 33.
43. See Julian Borger, U.S. Air Wars Under Trump: Increasingly Indiscriminate,
Increasingly Opaque, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/jan/23/us-air-wars-trump [https://perma.cc/T9GE-C3VA].
44. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. at 224–25; Kelly, supra note 33;
see Borger, supra note 43.
45. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594 (2006) (holding that the AUMF does not
expressly authorize the president to convene a military commission to try prisoners otherwise
detained under the AUMF); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521–22 (2004) (holding that
the AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force” language authorizes detention of enemy
combatants but does not authorize indefinite detention nor supersede a minimal due process
requirement); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 76 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Detaining an
individual who ‘substantially supports’ [a violent extremist organization], but is not part of it,
is simply not authorized by the AUMF itself or by the law of war.”); Gherebi v. Obama, 609
F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the AUMF not only encompasses the
organizations responsible for the 9/11 attacks but also the nations that sponsored those acts of
terrorism); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2109 (2005) (recognizing that new members
who join al-Qaeda after September 11, 2001, are still covered by the AUMF because of their
affiliation with an “organization” that falls under the AUMF).
47. See, e.g., Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (“The key inquiry, then, is not necessarily
whether one self-identifies as a member of the organization (although this could be relevant
in some cases), but whether the individual functions or participates within or under the
command structure of the organization . . . .”).
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boundaries of the AUMF’s authority.48 This expansive reading of the AUMF
invites future exercises of increased executive discretion.49 Many of the
AUMF’s puzzling applications and legal challenges derive from the its
exceptional brevity—the original public law was under 400 words.50
In addition to a slew of legal disputes challenging its authority, the AUMF
has consistently faced congressional resistance.51 On June 29, 2017, the
House Appropriations Committee approved an amendment that would have
effectively repealed the AUMF.52 Citing concerns that the AUMF grants the
president “authority to wage war in perpetuity,” the amendment was intended
to induce Congress to pass new legislation that would appropriately
modernize defense appropriations for the fight against ISIS.53 Although the
Senate ultimately rejected this proposal, this amendment was only the most
recent attack in a long history of congressional rebuffs to the AUMF’s
sprawling power.54 Despite congressional resistance, the AUMF remains a
valid authority for the executive to conduct drone strikes against al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, and the Islamic State across the globe.
C. The Global Procedural Due Process Rights of U.S. Citizens
Although the AUMF remains intact and continues to provide for assertive
displays of executive power throughout the world, it does not grant boundless
dominion. Even in the context of national security, some measure of
constitutional shielding always tempers the government’s ability to target a
U.S. citizen under the AUMF.55 However, the entirety of constitutional
protection does not extend globally—U.S. citizens only retain the
Constitution’s “fundamental guarantees” when abroad.56

48. Kelly, supra note 33.
49. See id.; see also Daniel Brown, Trump Will Keep the U.S. Military in Syria Without
New Congressional Authorization—and It Could Set a Dangerous Precedent, BUS. INSIDER
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-aumf-us-military-syria-withoutnew-authorization-2018-2 [https://perma.cc/3T5Q-SQ88].
50. See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)).
51. Jeremy Herb & Deirdre Walsh, House Panel Votes to Repeal War Authorization for
Fight Against ISIS and Al Qaeda, CNN (June 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/
politics/house-panel-repeal-war-authorization-isis-al-qaeda/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
8C2K-36H3].
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting the concerns of Democratic Representative Barbara Lee of California).
54. Joshua Keating, Barbara Lee’s Long War on the War on Terror, SLATE (Aug. 7,
2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/08/is_barbara_lee_
finally_winning_her_fight_to_repeal_the_aumf.html [https://perma.cc/7WL2-EJV6].
55. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (“The United States is entirely a creature of
the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”).
56. Id. at 6 (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the
shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life
and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”); see
also id. at 8–9 (noting that “fundamental” constitutional rights travel with U.S. citizens but
declining to explicitly list which rights travel and under what circumstances).
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The Supreme Court has recognized the right to procedural due process as
indivisibly tied to American citizenship on a global scale.57 In Reid v.
Covert,58 the Court found that a U.S. citizen was constitutionally entitled to
trial by jury, perhaps the supreme measure of formal process, despite living
abroad and falling under the scope of an international treaty granting
exclusive jurisdiction to a U.S. military tribunal.59 Although U.S. citizens
targeted under the AUMF may not be entitled to such a strong form of
procedural due process, the thrust of Reid implies that they enjoy some Fifth
Amendment protections, especially given that matters of life and death are
much more likely to receive constitutional protection.60 While American
citizens targeted domestically for their suspected links to terrorism are
virtually guaranteed to receive far greater due process,61 American citizens
targeted abroad under the sweeping power of the AUMF are not without
procedural protection.62 American citizens are a unique class under the
AUMF because they retain at least some modicum of procedural due process
protection regardless of their location.63
D. Justifying the Extrajudicial Drone Execution of an American Citizen
The DOJ White Memo provides incredible insight into how the executive
reconciles the modicum of procedural due process guaranteed to American
citizens abroad and the AUMF’s broad authority to conduct drone
executions.64 Originally a classified internal executive memo, public access
to the DOJ White Memo only resulted from a tense legal battle for more
information about Aulaqi’s execution.65 After Aulaqi’s death, the New York
Times and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the DOJ under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking disclosure of documents
57. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 270 (1990) (holding that
fundamental elements of the Fifth Amendment travel with citizens abroad); cf. Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769–71 (1950).
58. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
59. Id. at 16–17, 40–41.
60. See id. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In such cases [involving capital punishment]
the law is especially sensitive to demands for that procedural fairness which inheres in a
civilian trial . . . .”).
61. Federal criminal prosecution of domestic terror suspects relies upon numerous
substantive statutes. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40932, COMPARISON OF
RIGHTS IN MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT 8–9
(2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4VT-T2HU].
U.S.
federal courts have been internationally recognized for their “stringent procedural protection”
of terror suspects. Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism
Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 163–67 (2013).
62. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264, 270; Reid, 354 U.S. at 40–41, 77.
63. See supra notes 55–57. Noncitizens generally lack constitutional protection outside
the United States. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(“Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign
territory unless in respect of our own citizens . . . .”).
64. See DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 38–41.
65. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 103–08 (2d Cir.), opinion
amended on denial of reh’g, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir.), and supplemented, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir.
2014).

2018]

EXECUTIVE POWER, DRONES, AND DUE PROCESS

1195

detailing the executive’s rationale and methodology behind targeting a U.S.
citizen for drone execution.66 Although FOIA is designed to facilitate the
disclosure of previously unreleased information from the government, the
New York Times and ACLU faced a tumultuous and grueling legal battle.67
However, after nearly four years, they eventually succeeded in obtaining the
release of the government’s procedure for the targeted drone killing of an
American—the DOJ White Memo.68
Although the publicly released memo was redacted to remove classified
information and limited to disclosing solely legal analysis, it remains an
invaluable resource when assessing why the government opined that the Fifth
Amendment would not “preclude the contemplated lethal action” against
Aulaqi.69 The DOJ White Memo acknowledged that, as a U.S. citizen,
various elements of the Fifth Amendment shielded Aulaqi even while abroad
in Yemen.70 The DOJ White Memo roughly utilized the balancing test
devised in Mathews v. Eldridge to assess the requisite measure of due process
owed Aulaqi: weighing the private interest affected by the official action
against the government’s interest, while considering the burden of providing
greater process.71 Although much of the government’s reasoning is
unavailable to the public, the DOJ White Memo asserts that the “imminent”
threat Aulaqi posed to the American people significantly increased the
government’s interest in maintaining national security.72 The determination
that capturing Aulaqi would be “infeasible” likely supported the
government’s notion that providing greater due process would have been
difficult.73
The DOJ White Memo recognized that the risk of an unjustified execution
in the absence of sufficient process is an especially pertinent concern during
wartime.74 However, the weight of the government’s interest in nullifying
what it singularly deemed an imminent threat, coupled with “the realities of
combat,” was deemed to override any constitutional demand for additional
process.75 In coming to this determination, nearly one-third of the
government’s analysis relied on foreign jurisprudence.76 The DOJ White

66. Id. at 103–05.
67. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see N.Y. Times Co., 756 F.3d at
104–08. Before suing, representatives from the New York Times and the ACLU filed
numerous FOIA requests to the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, CIA, and Department of
Defense, all of which were all denied. N.Y. Times Co., 756 F.3d at 106–07. The New York
Times and ACLU also had to overcome the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the government. Id. at 108.
68. N.Y. Times Co., 756 F.3d at 103.
69. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 38.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 39.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 40.
74. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
75. Id.
76. See id. (citing HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (2) IsrLR 459,
504 (2006)). See infra notes 202–07 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
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Memo did not explicitly balance Aulaqi’s private life interest against the
other factors from the Mathews test, but instead asserted that the burden
imposed by the “circumstances of war,” together with the government’s
interest in neutralizing a perceived threat, justified the proposed execution
under the procedural requirements of the Fifth Amendment.77 Although
deemed an imminent threat, over a year elapsed between the date of the DOJ
White Memo and Aulaqi’s execution.78
E. Executive War-Making Authority and Unilateralism Within
a Federal Government of Divided Powers
In less than three pages, the DOJ White Memo concluded that the
executive could unilaterally assume the roles of prosecutor, jury, and
executioner and could kill an American citizen without affording any formal
process.79 Although the executive has broad authority to conduct military
affairs,80 our federal government is founded upon a delicate framework of
diffuse power.81 This system of checks and balances prevents one political
branch from developing tyrannical power.82 Examining traditional and
modern notions of the scope of executive war power within the greater
framework of the federal government provides insight into the executive’s
authority to act as a prosecutor, jury, and executioner when targeting an
American under the AUMF. This Part details historical views of unilateral
executive military power, analyzes contemporary interpretations of this
power, and describes how the political question doctrine can protect the
executive’s unilateral war-making power.
1. Founding Conceptualizations of Executive Military Authority
Literature from the Framers of the U.S. Constitution provides valuable
conceptualizations of the limits of executive war power. Reeling from the
injustices of the British monarchy leading up to the Revolutionary War, the
Framers were reluctant to imbue any branch of the federal government with
unchecked discretionary power and risk restarting another cycle of tyranny
James Madison, hailed as the “Father of the
and revolution.83
executive’s reliance on foreign jurisprudence when assessing the constitutional rights of a U.S.
citizen.
77. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 39–40 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530). See
infra Part II for an analysis of all elements of the Mathews test.
78. See DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 1.
79. See id. at 38–41.
80. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
81. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“[The Framers] rested the structure of our central government on the system of
checks and balances. For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it
was a felt necessity.”).
82. Id.
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at
205–06 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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Constitution,”84 articulated that the Constitution’s checks and balances
ensured federal power was both “necessary to the public good” and
sufficiently limited to prevent “a perversion of the power to the public
detriment.”85 Qualified power served as a guiding principle to Madison’s
constitutional contributions.86
Nowhere is the notion of qualified power more apparent than in the
Federalists’ literature surrounding executive military affairs.87 In one of the
earliest publications of The Federalist Papers, John Jay endorsed a unified
republic over the boundless power of a monarchy to prevent military action
“not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of [the] people.”88
Alexander Hamilton similarly noted that the distribution of war powers
among multiple branches prevented the executive from developing sovereign
military powers and degrading democracy into despotism.89 Although the
congressionally enacted AUMF evidences legislative consent to the
executive’s power to make war, its broad language enables executive
discretion and unilateralism that resemble a sovereign military power90—a
status quo starkly antagonistic to the Framer’s views on executive military
authority.91
Madison envisioned “constitutional barriers” as a shield against
unilateralism and sovereign tyranny, even during tenuous periods of national
crisis and war.92 Early Supreme Court jurisprudence quickly recognized the
federal judiciary as one such constitutional barrier.93 Shortly after the
ratification of the Constitution, the Court staked out its role as the ultimate
protector of constitutional liberties and the arbiter between the political
branches.94 In Marbury v. Madison,95 the Court recognized its purpose as
84. Who’s the Father of the Constitution?, LIBRARY CONGRESS (May 2005),
https://www.loc.gov/wiseguide/may05/constitution.html [https://perma.cc/LB8B-YMHM].
Despite Madison’s political and philosophical sophistication, it is worth noting that his
conceptualizations of race and civil liberties, along with many of the Framers, fall quite short
when examined under a modern lens. See, e.g., LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, DARK BARGAIN:
SLAVERY, PROFITS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 110 (2009) (acknowledging
that Madison proposed and formalized the adoption of the infamous Three-Fifths Clause
during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia).
85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 206 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
86. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245–46 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 347–50 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 18–19 (John Jay) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 19 (John Jay) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
89. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“In
this respect [as Commander-in-Chief] his authority would be nominally the same with that of
the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it.”); see also id. at 347–50.
90. See supra Part I.B.
91. See supra notes 83–90 and accompanying text.
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 207 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“It is in vain
to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.”).
93. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166–67 (1803).
94. Id. at 167 (“The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial,
and must be tried by the judicial authority.”). The Court recognized its own constitutionally
vested power of final review for both executive and legislative action. Id.
95. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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not only monitoring the constitutionality of government action but also
establishing whether a given right was vested by the Constitution.96 The
Court swiftly asserted the judiciary’s ability to temper executive actions that
threatened constitutionally vested rights of citizens, even in light of
legislative authority.97 Although over two hundred years old, this judicial
empowerment remains highly relevant today: the Court has repeatedly
rebuffed abusive executive actions made pursuant to the AUMF, recognized
the limits of the Act’s authority, and remedied the resulting infringements of
constitutional rights.98
2. Contemporary Views of Presidential War Power
Modern understandings of executive war power are largely grounded on
the tripartite framework introduced by Justice Robert H. Jackson’s seminal
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.99 Jackson
understood presidential authority as existing within a three-tiered hierarchy:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . .
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight . . . .
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .100

Jackson’s framework has been consistently used to evaluate executive
action since its inception.101 In the context of the War on Terror, the
AUMF’s broad language102 provides, at the very least, congressional
authorization for limited detention power103 and targeted killings.104 The
AUMF’s authorization for the executive to employ “all necessary and
96. Id. at 167.
97. Id. at 176 (“To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?”). Constitutional rights always trump congressional grants of authority. Id.
98. See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text.
99. 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 635–37 (footnote omitted).
101. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015);
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524–25 (2008); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983);
see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (finding Jackson’s tripartite
framework “analytically useful” for evaluating executive action as a “spectrum running from
explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition”).
102. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
103. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“[W]e understand Congress’ grant of
authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain for
the duration of the relevant conflict . . . .”).
104. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism,
Keynote Address at the Wilson Center: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s
Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacyand-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy [https://perma.cc/PQ9P-FAQH] (addressing targeted
drone executions).
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appropriate force” does not carve out any exceptions for actions taken against
U.S. citizens.105 Thus, it is very likely that an executive drone execution of
a U.S. citizen pursuant to the AUMF is a demonstration of presidential power
at its strongest ebb under Jackson’s tripartite framework.106
3. The President’s Shield: The Political Question Doctrine
The adage “the best defense is a good offense” has rung true for
centuries.107 In those terms, the political question doctrine provides the
executive with an incredible defense: to effectuate the separation of powers,
it bars the judiciary from scrutinizing the merits of fundamentally political
executive determinations, which include presidential decisions to initiate
military action.108 Under this doctrine, the judiciary abstains from reviewing
challenges to the wisdom of the president’s national policymaking.109 For
such determinations, the executive is solely accountable to the voting public
and “his own conscience.”110 However, while the judiciary is barred from
evaluating the wisdom of national political determinations, the political
question doctrine does not prevent the judiciary from reviewing the legality
of such decisions.111
Roughly ten months prior to Aulaqi’s execution, the government
successfully invoked the political question doctrine to prevent judicial
resolution of the executive’s impending death sentence for Aulaqi.112 Upon
learning that his son was added to an executive “kill list,” Aulaqi’s father
brought suit questioning his son’s impending execution and seeking, among
105. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
106. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
107. See Letter from George Washington to John Trumbull (June 25, 1799),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-04-02-0120 [http://perma.cc/7GF6LSET] (“[O]ffensive operations, often times, is the surest, if not the only (in some cases)
means of defence.”).
108. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803); see, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm.
Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The state-secrets privilege also
protects executive unilateralism and may be invoked by the government to block evidence or
completely bar adjudication to prevent the release of classified information. United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876). This Note
will exempt discussion of the state-secrets privilege and its relationship to executive
unilateralism given that the District Court for the District of Columbia strongly rebuffed the
government’s invocation of this privilege when assessing whether Aulaqi’s execution
presented an infringement of procedural due process. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta (Aulaqi II), 35 F.
Supp. 3d 56, 81 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting the government’s “truculent opposition” made the case
“unnecessarily difficult”).
109. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–66 (“The subjects [of exclusive executive
discretion] are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to
the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.”).
110. Id.
111. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus., 607 F.3d at 842 (“[T]he presence of a political question . . .
turns not on the nature of the government conduct under review but more precisely on the
question the plaintiff raises about the challenged action.”); see also Schneider v. Kissinger,
412 F.3d 190, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.
1992).
112. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama (Aulaqi I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C. 2010).
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other things, a preliminary injunction to stop the government’s proposed
execution unless concrete standards were implemented and satisfied.113 The
court in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama114 (Aulaqi I) held that the political question
doctrine barred judicial review of Aulaqi’s links to terrorist groups, the extent
of his alleged terrorist activity, and his inclusion on an executive “kill list”
because such inquiries scrutinized the merits of discretionary executive
policymaking as opposed to questioning the legality of such decisions.115
The government’s motion to dismiss was granted and Aulaqi was executed
within a year.116
After Aulaqi’s death, his father once again brought suit against the
government, this time seeking redress for his son’s execution.117 The same
court that had previously dismissed his case in Aulaqi I found this second suit
was not barred from judicial review under the political question doctrine.118
The complaint in Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta119 (Aulaqi II) focused on the
executive’s alleged infringement of due process rights and other
constitutional liberties.120 Shifting away from evaluating discretionary
executive decisions toward the legality of executive action resulted in
justiciable subject matter.121 Despite recognizing that Aulaqi’s execution
presented a plausible due process claim,122 the court was forced to dismiss
the case after finding that no remedy under U.S. law could provide relief.123
The executive escaped culpability for Aulaqi’s execution a second time.124
II. A THUMB ON THE SCALE: THE BALANCING ACT OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND DRONE EXECUTIONS
The judiciary’s recognition of a potential due process infringement arising
from the outer limits of executive power warrants a deeper inquiry.125 The
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test,126 used by both the government in the
DOJ White Memo127 and the Supreme Court in assessing due process issues
arising from the War on Terror,128 guides an exploration of the executive’s
unilateral methodology for the drone execution of an American citizen.
113. Id. at 12.
114. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
115. Id. at 52. The court also found that Aulaqi’s father lacked standing to bring a claim
on Aulaqi’s behalf, who theoretically could have appeared in court himself despite being
added to an executive “kill list.” Id. at 35.
116. Id. at 54; see Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta (Aulaqi II), 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 60 (D.D.C. 2014).
117. Aulaqi II, 35 F. Supp. at 58–59.
118. Id. at 70. In Aulaqi II, Aulaqi’s father was unhindered by any issues of standing
because he was bringing a claim on behalf of a decedent. See id. at 59.
119. 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014).
120. Id. at 70.
121. Id. at 69.
122. Id. at 74.
123. Id. at 80.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 73–74.
126. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
127. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 39–41.
128. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
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While the DOJ White Memo did not explicitly balance all of the Mathews
factors,129 this Note fully examines each factor to assess whether additional
measures of process should be implemented to prevent an unjustified drone
execution.130 This Part maps the Mathews test’s four elements: Part II.A
analyzes the private life interest of American citizens targeted for drone
execution under the AUMF, while Part II.B explores the government’s
underlying national security interests in drone strikes. Part II.C scrutinizes
the risk of an unjustified execution or erroneous loss of life under the
executive’s current methodology, and Part II.D examines the benefits of
implementing a system of judicial review to reduce the risk of an unjustified
drone execution.
A. Private Life Interest of Drone Targets
The exploration of procedural due process concerns underlying drone
strikes targeting Americans commences by evaluating the first prong of the
Mathews test: the private citizen’s interest affected by the official action.131
This private interest is an individual citizen’s right to life, liberty, or
property.132
Drone executions are not intended to maim, injure, or merely frighten their
victims—the government shoots to kill.133 Thus, the private citizen’s interest
at stake in a drone strike is the private citizen’s life.134 Not only traditionally
revered since the dawn of legal scholarship135 and explicitly enumerated
within the safeguards of the Fifth Amendment,136 the protection of a citizen’s
life also enjoys the utmost consideration by our highest court:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One’s right to life . . . and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.137

Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the value of the private life interest at risk
in drone executions. No other private interest is as incapable of redress upon

129. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
130. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; supra Parts II.A–D.
131. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
132. See id.; see also Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 894–96 (1961).
133. See Brennan, supra note 104.
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125 (describing the Magna
Carta’s protection of “personal security” as encompassing “a person’s legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation”).
136. See supra note 9.
137. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985) (“The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal
proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling.”).
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deprivation or as inherently valuable as one’s own life.138 The private life
interest is in a singular class of individual rights that are irretrievable upon
deprivation.
Supreme Court deliberations on the government’s deprivation of a U.S.
citizen’s liberty interest are a useful comparative measure to assess the
magnitude of a citizen’s life interest. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,139 a U.S. citizen
designated as an enemy combatant was captured in Afghanistan pursuant to
the AUMF and eventually detained in a naval brig in South Carolina without
formal charges, access to an impartial tribunal, or any assistance of legal
counsel.140 The detainee’s father petitioned for writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that the government’s lack of formal process infringed his son’s
Fifth Amendment rights.141 Through an analysis guided by the Mathews
balancing test, a plurality of the Court found that the AUMF’s grant of
“necessary and appropriate force” did not authorize indefinite detention, as
the government had argued.142 Furthermore, the plurality determined that
the citizen-detainee must be informed of the factual basis for his detention
and provided a reasonable opportunity to protest his detainment.143 The
plurality also acted to lessen the government’s burden in recognizing the
citizen-detainee’s liberty interest by permitting the “realities of combat” to
relax the requisite measure of due process owed to the detainee144 and
lessening evidentiary burdens during detainment proceedings.145
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ensured that at least some formal
measures of due process accompanied the deprivation of a liberty interest to
comport with constitutional guarantees.146 In Woodson v. North Carolina,147
Justice Potter Stewart masterfully articulated the vast difference between the
indefinite deprivation of liberty at risk in Hamdi and the permanent
termination of life at risk in drone executions: “Death, in its finality, differs
more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of
only a year or two.”148 Given that a life interest is unequivocally more

138. See Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (“An
erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of
correction.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 (1976) (noting that death is a
“unique and irreversible penalty”).
139. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
140. Id. at 510–11.
141. Id. at 511.
142. Id. at 520–21.
143. Id. at 533.
144. Id. at 531.
145. Id. at 533–34 (“Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable
available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.”).
146. See id. at 530 (“[A]s critical as the Government’s interest may be in detaining those
who actually pose an immediate threat . . . history and common sense teach us that an
unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and
abuse . . . .”).
147. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
148. Id. at 305.
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valuable than a liberty interest,149 Hamdi implies that some measure of
formal process should necessarily accompany decisions that could result in
the deprivation of a citizen’s life.150
Four years after Hamdi was decided, the Supreme Court held that
noncitizens are also entitled to formal measures of due process when detained
pursuant to the AUMF.151 This holding further supports the notion that
American citizens targeted for drone execution under the AUMF deserve
some manner of formal procedural protection. First, U.S. citizens
undoubtedly enjoy stronger constitutional protection than noncitizens in
times of war.152 Second, a drone execution poses a much more punitive
sentence than interim detainment153—as noted above, the permanent
deprivation of a private life interest is infinitely weightier than the temporary
deprivation of a private liberty interest.154 If even noncitizens are afforded
bilateral measures of due process in connection with the deprivation of a
liberty interest,155 it certainly follows that the magnitude of an American
citizen’s private life interest deserves at least some formal measure of
procedural protection.156
However, some would argue that the benefits of U.S. citizenship should
not extend to those who may be actively seeking the destruction of the United
States.157 Under such an analysis, those who forfeit their allegiance to
America by aligning themselves with a group targeted under the AUMF are
undeserving of any due process protection, regardless of the high value the
Supreme Court has associated with a private citizen’s life interest.158 Despite
this appeal to base emotion, the Supreme Court has held that treasonous
activity does not diminish the private interest of a U.S. citizen when assessing
that citizen’s due process rights.159 Moreover, U.S. citizenship, and its
149. See id. (“[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.”); see also supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
150. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535 (“[T]he threats to military operations posed by a basic
system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights . . . .”);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
151. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008) (holding that noncitizens detained
as enemy combatants under the AUMF were entitled to have the merits of their detention
reviewed by both executive military officers in tribunal proceedings and Article III judges in
federal courts).
152. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (“It is war that exposes the
relative vulnerability of the alien’s status.”); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
153. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 794 (noting that, in related cases, detainees had been
imprisoned for six years without judicial oversight).
154. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
155. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795.
156. See id.; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; see also supra notes 135–38, 149 and
accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Jim Moret, What Rights Should Terrorists Have?, HUFFINGTON POST
(June
20,
2013),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-moret/what-rights-shouldterror_b_3123290.html [https://perma.cc/KRB4-9S48] (arguing that a suspected terrorist
forfeits the advantages of U.S. citizenship when he declares war on his country).
158. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
159. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (“Nor is the weight on [the private
interest] side of the Mathews scale offset by . . . the accusation of treasonous behavior.”).
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associated constitutional protection, can stem from purely geographical
qualities that are wholly unrelated to an individual’s actions or loyalties.160
Once bestowed, the constitutional benefits of U.S. citizenship are utterly
inalienable.
B. Government’s Interest in National Security
The investigation of procedural due process rights and drone executions
targeting Americans continues with the second prong of the Mathews test:
the government’s interest in carrying out the official action.161 This interest
drives the actions of federal actors who, in turn, affect the private citizen’s
interest in life, liberty, or property.162
AUMF drone strikes are an indispensable element of the United States’s
global counterterrorism strategy that protects American citizens.163 National
security has long been recognized as a deeply persuasive, if not the most
persuasive, government interest.164 Much like a citizen’s life interest, the
executive’s broad control over the military is explicitly enumerated within
the Constitution.165 Alexander Hamilton provided one of the earliest
conceptualizations linking this remarkable grant of power to demanding the
vigorous maintenance of our nation’s borders and fiercely protecting the lives
of American citizens.166 Over two centuries later, Hamilton’s arguments for
a strong and “energetic” executive remain highly relevant: the former legal
advisor to the Bush administration explicitly relied on Hamilton’s reasoning
when interpreting the executive’s constitutionally enumerated military power
as a preeminent responsibility to anticipate and defend against foreign
attacks.167 This responsibility could naturally extend to employing drone
strikes to preemptively neutralize the threat posed by dangerous
individuals.168 The Constitution’s explicit grant of presidential military

160. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012) (“The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof . . . .”); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958) (“Citizenship is not a license
that expires upon misbehavior.”); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 135–36 (1868) (“The right to
life and to personal safety is not only sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is
inalienable.” (emphasis added)).
161. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
162. See id.
163. See supra Parts I.A–B.
164. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
165. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”).
166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“Of all the cares or
concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”).
167. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor
or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 489–90 (2002).
168. See id. at 487–88.
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power provides nearly peerless authority for recognizing national security as
an utmost and robust government interest.
The authoritative interpreters of the Constitution have consistently arrived
at a similar conclusion. In Haig v. Agee,169 Chief Justice Warren Burger
declared that “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest
is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”170 Chief Justice Earl
Warren similarly recognized national security as one of the “weightiest
considerations” when assessing due process rights.171 The pages of history
provide further validation of the incredible latitude given to the executive in
matters of national security: in the Prize Cases,172 the Court commended
President Lincoln’s preemptive blockade of Southern ports during the Civil
War absent an official congressional declaration of war.173 More recently,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recognized the value of preventive military
action by acknowledging the government’s interest in detaining individuals
who pose an impending threat to the lives of U.S. citizens as “crucially
important” and “critical.”174 The Court’s continued endorsement of
preventive military action supports the executive’s use of the AUMF to carry
out preemptive drone strikes against imminent threats.175 The AUMF is an
integral component of the government’s mighty interest in maintaining our
nation’s post-9/11 security blanket and fighting the War on Terror.176
However, drone executions of Americans advance a grim question: Under
what circumstances can taking one citizen’s life preemptively be justified to
potentially save many others’ lives?
C. The Risk of an Unjustified Drone Execution
Explicit constitutional enumerations and powerful Supreme Court
jurisprudence firmly entrench both the private citizen’s life interest and the
government’s interest in preserving national security. The third prong of the
Mathews procedural due process test ascertains the likelihood that the
government’s actions would cause the erroneous deprivation of a private
citizen’s interest in life, liberty, or property.177 The risk of an erroneous
deprivation is the likelihood that the government’s actions would
unjustifiably affect an individual’s life, liberty, or property rights in the
absence of sufficient due process.178 Assessing the risk of erroneous
169. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
170. Id. at 307 (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
171. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1965) (holding that the plaintiff’s right to travel to
Cuba, a “liberty” under the Fifth Amendment, was trumped by national security concerns
stemming from the Cuban Missile Crisis).
172. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862)
173. See id. at 669 (“The President was bound to meet [the Civil War] in the shape it
presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to
it by him or them could change the fact.” (emphasis added)).
174. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520, 530 (2004).
175. Cf. id.
176. See id. at 510; Kelly, supra note 33; see also supra Parts I.A–B.
177. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
178. Id.
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deprivation is the cornerstone of procedural due process evaluations and an
integral component of the Mathews test.179 In the context of AUMF drone
strikes, the risk of erroneous deprivation is the probability that the executive
targets and executes an innocent individual.180 The high value of an
individual’s right to life substantially raises the stakes of this assessment:
while property can be returned or compensated for, death is irreversible.181
Avoiding the unjustified or mistaken deprivation of life is of the utmost
importance.182
Strikingly, the executive never formally charged Aulaqi in connection with
plotting, aiding, or committing an act of terror before his execution.183 The
absence of formal charges eviscerated any opportunity for Aulaqi to
understand the nature of his alleged crimes or to protest such claims.184
Indictments and formal charges make criminal proceedings legitimate.185
Few legal principles are more fundamental than articulating the nature of a
suspect’s crimes before enacting punishment.186 The Magna Carta
recognized this cardinal tenet over 800 years ago: “No freeman shall be
seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any way
destroyed . . . except[] by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of
the land.”187 In Aulaqi’s case, the executive provided no discernible method
to stake out which “law of the land” was violated and instead substituted legal
examination by peers for execution by adversary.188 Executive officials
made their own classified determination of the illegality of the citizen’s
actions and refused to abide by traditional criminal process or sentencing.189
The absence of formal charges and standard criminal process removes an
integral grounding mechanism for executive discretion and eliminates any
opportunity to understand or refute the alleged illegality prior to execution,
thereby increasing the likelihood of an unjustified execution and the risk of
an erroneous deprivation.
Another grounding mechanism for executive power is public
accountability and, by extension, the decisions of the voting public in

179. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural due process rules are
meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 (“[P]rocedural
due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process . . . .”).
180. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 344.
181. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
185. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 934 (1997); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972).
186. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (“The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from
a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice.”).
187. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215) (emphasis added).
188. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 5–6, 12 and accompanying text.
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elections.190 The wisdom of the executive’s political decisions, albeit outside
the realm of the judicial review,191 is subject to constant evaluation by the
voting public and their elected representatives.192 Public scrutiny limits
executive discretion.193 Employing a secretive, internal procedure to carry
out the drone execution of a U.S. citizen enables the executive to distance
itself from the laws and procedures publicly elected officials enacted to
combat terrorism.194 In turn, this methodology marginalizes the public’s
voting decisions and minimizes the impact of public accountability on
The absence of meaningful public
executive decision-making.195
accountability erases another necessary check on executive discretion and
further magnifies the possibility that an AUMF drone strike erroneously
deprives an American citizen’s life.
Beyond eschewing standard criminal process, the executive’s calculated
unilateralism also significantly increases the risk of an unjustified execution.
The DOJ White Memo asserts that “a decision-maker could reasonably
decide that the threat posed by al-Aulaqi’s activities to United States persons
is ‘continued’ and ‘imminent.’”196 This argument implies that a federal
judge (the aforementioned “decision-maker”) would likely sanction a
citizen’s execution as a valid response to the “imminent threat of violence or
death.”197 Executive officials are inserting their own analysis of imminence
and assuming a federal judge would agree.198 However, federal judges are
the experts on evaluating imminence, not the executive: imminence is a legal
standard federal judges authoritatively determine as a regular component of
federal standing.199 Supplanting a “decision-maker[’s]” legal expertise with
190. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (arguing that the executive’s “due dependence
on the people” is the primary “ingredient” to preserve republican and democratic values).
191. See supra Part I.E.3.
192. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
193. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355
(Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
194. See Karen J. Greenberg, Prosecuting Terrorists in Civilian Courts Still Works,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/isistrump-terrorist-obama-court-military-guantanamo/546296/ [https://perma.cc/HFG7-GLZG]
(recognizing the viability of federal courts to successfully try terrorism subjects under
domestic U.S. law).
195. The appointment of chief federal prosecutors, who try terrorism cases on behalf of the
government, is subject to Senate confirmation and is an extension of public voting decisions.
Direct Election of Senators, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm [https://perma.cc/V2QH-NGF5] (last visited
Nov. 15, 2018); see, e.g., Benjamin Mueller et al., Prosecutors Describe Driver’s Plan to Kill
in Manhattan Terror Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
11/01/nyregion/driver-had-been-planning-attack-in-manhattan-for-weeks-police-say.html
[https://perma.cc/VX4G-KYT9] (describing the role of federal prosecutors in pursuing an
alleged terrorist).
196. DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 39 (quoting a redacted source).
197. Id. at 39, 40.
198. See id.
199. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)
(holding that Article III standing requires that “the alleged harm must be actual or imminent,
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unqualified executive judgment risks creating differing standards of
imminence and dramatically increases the possibility of an unjustified drone
execution and an erroneous death.
Beyond a unilateral determination of imminence, the DOJ White Memo’s
recommended methodology entails the executive exclusively assessing the
constitutional rights of an American citizen.200 In doing so, the executive
singularly defines the extent of procedural due process afforded a citizen
targeted for drone execution.201 Additionally, the DOJ White Memo
evidenced executive reliance on Israeli jurisprudence to justify the absence
of formal process afforded Aulaqi.202 However, the executive is not
equipped to unilaterally assess the boundaries of constitutional liberties—as
noted over 200 years ago in Marbury v. Madison, the judiciary is the
unparalleled and supreme interpreter of the Constitution.203 The judiciary is
solely empowered to declare the existence and extent of constitutional rights,
such as procedural due process minimums.204 The harm posed by the
executive’s unqualified analysis of procedural due process rights is
magnified by its reliance on foreign jurisprudence.205 As Justice Breyer
succinctly noted: “[F]oreign authority does not bind us. After all, we are
interpreting a ‘Constitution for the United States of America.’”206 The
executive’s reliance on foreign jurisprudence is especially conspicuous given
it is employing non-U.S. law to constrain the scope of rights explicitly
granted under the Fifth Amendment—in other words, the executive is
deploying foreign law to limit supreme domestic law.207 The executive
unilaterally gauging the requisite due process mandated by the Constitution,
and supporting such propositions with foreign jurisprudence that narrows
domestic law, greatly increases the likelihood that an American citizen could
be unjustifiably targeted and executed via drone strike. The executive’s

not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’” (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02
(1983))). The standard of “imminent harm” has been evaluated by federal judges in a plethora
of contexts. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411–13 (2013)
(wiretapping foreign contacts); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (lethal injection);
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–29 (2007) (pending patent
prosecution); Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1996) (contaminated soil);
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564–65 (1992) (endangered animals).
200. See DOJ White Memo, supra note 12, at 38–41.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 40 (noting that “arrest, investigation and trial” may be impracticable (quoting
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (2) IsrLR 459, 504 (2006))).
203. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–67 (1803); see supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
204. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–67; see supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
205. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (asserting that the Supreme Court “should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans”); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari); see also Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 32, 86 (2005) (“If foreign decisions are freely citable, any judge wanting a supporting
citation has only to troll deeply enough in the world’s corpora juris to find it.”).
206. Knight, 528 U.S. at 996 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (quoting
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868, n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
207. See supra notes 9, 200–02 and accompanying text.
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unilateral methodology, as evidenced throughout the DOJ White Memo,
greatly increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation of life.
D. Judicial Review as a Safeguard Against
the Erroneous Deprivation of Life
The final element of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test analyzes the
potential benefit of implementing additional procedural safeguards to ensure
against an erroneous deprivation.208 The abuses of the AUMF drone
program have prompted various proposals incorporating judicial review as a
means of providing additional due process and safeguarding against
unjustified executions.209 The wide spectrum of proposed judicial solutions
can be segregated into ex ante review (i.e., preemptive judicial review of
proposed drone strikes)210 and ex post review (i.e., implementing an effective
post hoc legal regime that enables courts to provide meaningful relief for the
families of those killed by unjustified drone strikes).211 Part II.D.1 examines
the significant benefits of the judiciary reviewing AUMF drone executions
targeting American citizens, and Part II.D.2 surveys the foundational aspects
of ex ante and ex post regimes.
1. The Merits of Judicial Review
While some may shudder at imposing a judicial check on the sphere of
military power explicitly accorded the executive,212 it remains integral to a
federal government of divided powers.213 Justice Anthony Kennedy vividly
articulated the necessity of the judiciary reviewing executive war-making
authority:
208. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). While a plethora of potential
safeguards could be implemented to reduce the possibility of an unjustified drone execution,
this Note will solely examine two popular judicial solutions: ex post and ex ante judicial
review.
209. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Drones Are Focus as C.I.A. Nominee Goes
Before Senators, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/us/politics/
senate-panel-will-question-brennan-on-targeted-killings.html
[https://perma.cc/T9KHCAE8]; Scott Shane, Debating a Court to Vet Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/a-court-to-vet-kill-lists.html [https://perma.cc/
362Z-GXR2]; Editorial, A Court for Targeted Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/opinion/a-special-court-is-needed-to-review-targetedkillings.html [https://perma.cc/Y2AA-79AA].
210. See generally Jeh Johnson, Former Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Keynote Address at
the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School: A “Drone Court”: Some Pros and
Cons (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/jeh-johnson-speech-drone-court-somepros-and-cons [https://perma.cc/Y33A-6MQD].
211. See generally Joshua Andresen, Note, Due Process of War in the Age of Drones, 41
YALE J. INT’L L. 155 (2016).
212. See supra Part II.B; see also Neomi Rao, Real Drone Strike Accountability Requires
Political Checks, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2015/04/24/should-a-court-approve-all-drone-strikes/real-drone-strikeaccountability-requires-political-checks [https://perma.cc/9UNM-2KXR] (arguing that
Congress should provide the necessary political solutions to curb transparency and due process
concerns irrespective of the federal judiciary).
213. See supra Parts I.E.1–2.
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Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among
these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal
liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. . . .
Our opinion does not undermine the Executive’s powers as
Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is
vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.214

Justice Kennedy espoused the value of the political branches engaging in
“genuine debate” over how to best preserve constitutional values while
fending off the threat of terrorism.215 The Court has held that the limits of
military discretion, which could include targeting an American citizen for
drone execution, is one such area of “genuine debate” reserved exclusively
for the judiciary.216
Originalist critics fearful of judicial overreach need not worry: Justice
Kennedy’s conceptualization of separation of powers is not isolated nor
modernist; rather, as noted above, this viewpoint has been consistently
articulated since the days of the Framers.217 Hamilton, Jay, and Madison all
championed a system of checks and balances that restrained executive
authority from devolving into tyrannical rule empowered by reckless military
discretion.218 Marbury v. Madison recognized the ability of the judiciary to
temper executive authority whenever constitutionally vested rights come
under siege, even by actions purportedly supported by federal legislation.219
In the Framers’ eyes, the judiciary ensures that broad federal legislation—
such as the AUMF—can never grant free rein to the executive over the
military and the constitutional rights of American citizens.
However, we do not live in the colonial era of the Framers and 200-yearold conceptualizations of diffuse federal power are not necessarily
determinative.220 Per Justice Jackson’s modern tripartite framework for
analyzing executive power, the AUMF’s explicit congressional authorization
of executive war-making power elevates presidential power to its strongest
ebb.221 However, the judiciary has consistently established that it is fully
empowered to review and rebuff executive actions made pursuant to the
AUMF.222 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme Court rejected
the government’s claim that the AUMF authorized indefinite detention.223 In
214. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008).
215. Id. at 798.
216. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (“What are the allowable limits of
military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are
judicial questions.”).
217. See supra Part I.E.1.
218. Id.; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (“Even before the birth
of this country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”).
219. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66, 176–77 (1803); see also supra
notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
220. See generally Aaron Blake, Neil Gorsuch, Antonin Scalia and Originalism, Explained,
WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/
01/neil-gorsuch-antonin-scalia-and-originalism-explained/ [https://perma.cc/JEC5-XA7S].
221. See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
223. 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,224 the Court rejected the government’s assertion that
the AUMF enabled the executive to convene military commissions.225 In
Hamlily v. Obama,226 a court found that the AUMF does not authorize the
detention of those who “substantially support” al-Qaeda but are not a part of
it, again rejecting the government’s assertion of its detention authority under
the AUMF.227 Even when the executive is vested with the strongest possible
level of authority via the AUMF,228 presidential power always remains
subject to judicial scrutiny and tempering. The judiciary’s authority to rebuff
executive discretion under the AUMF makes it the preeminent safeguard
against an unjustified execution. Put simply, “a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s
citizens.”229
2. The Spectrum of Judicial Assessment: Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Review
A tragic history of unintended civilian casualties, further compounded by
Aulaqi’s execution, has produced a wide spectrum of proposals advocating
for the implementation of judicial review to safeguard against the erroneous
deprivation of life frequently associated with drone strikes.230 On one end
of the spectrum, some have advocated for a preemptive, ex ante judicial
check on proposed drone strikes targeting American citizens analogous to the
surveillance courts currently in operation.231 These surveillance courts
review classified information provided solely by the executive in
nonadversarial hearings before providing surveillance warrants.232
Similarly, preemptive judicial review of proposed drone strikes would not
resolve preexisting cases or controversies, but rather evaluate whether the
proposed use of lethal force against an enemy combatant would be justified
based upon classified information provided by the executive.233 Preemptive
judicial review of proposed drone strikes targeting Americans would
introduce an independent arbiter to examine the legal sufficiency of the
executive’s evidence.234 Introducing an independent system of review could
mitigate executive discretion and prevent drone strikes for which the
executive lacks sufficient evidence, thereby reducing the risk of an
unjustified drone execution.235 Theoretically, this approach may delay drone

224. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
225. Id. at 559.
226. 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
227. Id. at 75–77.
228. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952); supra
notes 99–106 and accompanying text.
229. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
230. See supra notes 37, 209–11 and accompanying text.
231. Johnson, supra note 210.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Editorial, supra note 209.
235. See id.
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strikes pending judicial decision and could be more burdensome for the
executive.236
On the other end of the judicial-safeguard spectrum, ex post review
provides the opportunity for a retrospective adversarial hearing in which both
the government and a private individual or entity can present evidence after
a drone strike has occurred.237 Adversarial hearings provide increased
“procedural legitimacy” and “substantive accuracy,” which can help victims
of unjustified drone strikes find relief.238 These post hoc hearings would
enable judges to examine a complete set of facts, which would not always be
possible during preemptive ex ante review.239 While there is currently no
remedy for families suing on behalf of American citizens killed by drone
strikes,240 some have proposed the creation of a statutory right to nominal
damages as the “least-worst” option to rein in AUMF drone strikes.241
Legislation that provides for damages could incentivize increased executive
diligence—both out of a desire to avoid the costs of being sued and the
associated negative publicity—and potentially decrease the likelihood of an
erroneous execution.242
III. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS WORTH A POUND OF CURE:
IMPLEMENTING AN EX ANTE LEGAL REGIME
TO PREVENT UNJUSTIFIED DRONE EXECUTIONS
A high risk of the erroneous deprivation of life,243 coupled with incredibly
weighty private and government interests,244 demand additional procedural
protection to ensure that the next Aulaqi is not the victim of a potentially
unjustified execution.245 Ex ante judicial review of proposed drone strikes is
the superlative check on executive discretion and the best safeguard of the
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due process. Part III.A identifies
the pragmatic benefits offered by ex ante review that would be impracticable
under any post hoc legal regime. Part III.B details an ex ante methodology
that respects the judiciary’s constitutionally vested authority but is not overly
burdensome to the government’s vital interest in preserving national security.

236. See id.
237. Jameel Jaffer, Judicial Review of Targeted Killings, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 185, 186
(2013).
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. See supra notes 122–23.
241. Steve Vladeck, Why a “Drone Court” Won’t Work—but (Nominal) Damages
Might . . . , LAWFARE (Feb. 10, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-drone-court-wontwork-nominal-damages-might [https://perma.cc/YL2P-MQKV].
242. See id.
243. See supra Part II.C.
244. See supra Parts II.A–B.
245. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta (Aulaqi II), 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 74 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that
Aulaqi’s execution gave rise to a “plausible” due process claim).
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A. The Pragmatism of Ex Ante Review over Ex Post Review
An ex ante legal regime is a supremely more effective means of supplying
additional process and curbing executive excess than ex post review. Ex ante
review allows for the prevention of constitutional infringement that may
otherwise be incapable of judicial redress. In addition to highlighting the
problematic standing requirements that may impede those seeking relief,
Aulaqi I demonstrated the hardship imposed by the political question
doctrine, which prohibited Aulaqi’s father from questioning his son’s
inclusion on an executive “kill list” and effectively ended his efforts to stop
his son’s impending execution.246 Aulaqi’s family was similarly denied
relief in Aulaqi II—despite bringing a plausible due process claim—because
no U.S. law could provide damages or other remedies.247 As such, ex post
review would likely require a congressional remedy for damages to ensure
any form of meaningful post hoc judicial process.248 However, the
significant procedural burdens noted above would be nearly prohibitive for
plaintiffs seeking relief from such a congressional remedy. Many plaintiffs
would be denied relief in an ex post regime simply because of how their
complaint was framed249 or due to lack of standing.250 Ex post review hinges
upon an inaccessible remedy that, given the immense value of human life,
will necessarily be inadequate every time.251
In contrast, preemptive judicial inquiries in an ex ante regime could be
narrowly centered on evaluating legal concerns and thus not be barred under
the political question doctrine.252 To avoid issues of justiciability under the
political question doctrine, ex ante judicial review would not attack foreign
policymaking but rather examine compliance with law and constitutional
guarantees253—both of which are quintessential judicial functions.254
Preemptive ex ante review can effectively sidestep the legal roadblocks that
would make an ex post regime unworkable for plaintiffs seeking relief.
Plaintiffs in an ex post review are not the only ones who would needlessly
suffer. The post hoc nature of ex post review makes it nearly impossible to
prevent an unjustified drone execution, which effectively nullifies the value
of the private citizen’s life interest in the due process calculus.255 The
246. See supra notes 112–16.
247. See supra notes 122–23.
248. Vladeck, supra note 241.
249. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 122–23.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. See supra notes 108–16 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 108–16; cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126 (1986) (stating that
the “narrow categories of ‘political questions’” should not be transformed into an “ad hoc
litmus test of this Court’s reactions to the desirability of and need for judicial application of
constitutional or statutory standards to a given type of claim”).
254. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly found that claims based on [due process] rights
are justiciable, even if they implicate foreign policy decisions.”).
255. See supra note 138.
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executive’s record of abuse and mistreatment throughout the War on Terror
provides a cautionary tale of the dangers posed by unchecked executive
discretion.256 Ex ante review provides an opportunity to preemptively curb
such discretion, while ex post review would do little, if anything, to slow the
government’s escalating record of human rights abuses in the War on
Terror.257 Ex ante review offers an invaluable preventive mechanism that
lives up to the promises of our Constitution.
B. Toeing the Line: A Narrow Ex Ante Legal Regime
An ex ante regime to review proposed drone strikes could be efficiently
implemented via congressional act. Congress has already displayed its
willingness to promulgate acts that create courts dedicated to specialized,
preemptive review258 and has repeatedly rebuffed the AUMF’s expansive
power.259 Ex ante review of proposed drone strikes must be precisely
tailored to provide an additional layer of process without devolving into an
undue burden on the government.260 To ensure that the executive is free to
vigorously conduct counterterrorism operations overseas,261 ex ante review
should be limited to instances where the executive believes it is necessary to
target an American citizen. Notwithstanding that noncitizens lack significant
(if any) procedural due process rights outside the United States that would
merit ex ante judicial review,262 this initial threshold significantly reduces
the government’s burden by allowing them to conduct the vast majority of
AUMF drone operations unfettered by judicial review. Article III judges, as
opposed to state judges, should be selected for ex ante review as they are the
preeminent arbiters between the political branches and are uniquely equipped
to assess the constitutional rights of citizens.263
But how should such Article III judges be selected? Permitting the
executive to select judges would acquiesce to a new cycle of unilateralism
and defeat the ideals of diffuse power inherent in independent review.264
Rather, a panel of three federal judges should be selected randomly from the
circuit court that has jurisdiction over the targeted citizen’s last known
domicile in the United States. This procedure ensures a randomized system
of independent review by competent decision makers that would break the
pattern of executive unilateralism. A panel of three judges tips the due
process scales in favor of the private citizen’s life interest and greatly

256. See supra note 30.
257. See supra note 30.
258. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2012).
259. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
260. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004) (noting that the “realities of combat”
may induce “necessary and appropriate” military action and that “due process analysis need
not blink at those realities”). However, the Court proceeded to assert that “essential
constitutional promises may not be eroded.” Id. at 533.
261. See Kelly, supra note 33.
262. See supra note 63.
263. See supra Part I.E.1.
264. See supra Part I.E.1.
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decreases the risk of erroneous deprivation by promoting a more thorough
review than a single judge and decreasing the likelihood that the executive
can coercively present evidence. This balance is necessary given these
hearings would be nonadversarial and would only involve evidence
presented by the government. However, heightened review from a panel is
likely to be less timely than a single judge’s assessment and is therefore more
burdensome to the government’s interest in robustly maintaining national
security.265
To offset this increased burden, the panel should only review information
precisely tailored to the preeminent legal concept at stake: whether the
citizen poses an imminent threat.266 Given that Article III judges are solely
qualified to make an authoritative determination of imminence in the context
of the federal government, judicial review of the imminency of harm greatly
reduces the risk of an unjustified execution.267 Prohibiting the executive
from making an authoritative judgment on imminence will greatly improve
the accuracy of the decision-making underlying drone executions and align
ex ante drone proceedings with both the promises of the Fifth Amendment
and the constitutional empowerments of the executive and the judiciary.268
To further improve the integrity of these ex ante proceedings and to protect
national security, all evidence presented to the panel should be redacted to
remove identifying information about the proposed target’s identity. Not
only would these omissions lessen the executive’s evidentiary burden to
comport with analogous Supreme Court precedent,269 it also decreases the
likelihood of bias entering the panel’s determinations and greatly diminishes
the probability that classified information could leak to the public and disrupt
the executive’s proposed strike.270 If a majority of the panel believes the
citizen poses an imminent threat, the proposed strike may proceed. Requiring
only a majority of the judges to sanction the strike lessens the burden on the
government by ensuring that a single judge cannot exercise veto power.
This methodology greatly refines the scope of evidence the executive must
provide the panel of judges, which diminishes the government’s burden
while still allowing for a thorough review of the integral legal concern at
stake. While fully recognizing both the executive’s military power271 and
the judiciary’s constitutional authority,272 this legal regime reduces the
likelihood of an unjustified execution by centering judicial review around the

265. See supra notes 163–76 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., supra note 145 and accompanying text.
270. Justice Thomas’s dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld voiced his concerns that the plurality’s
holding would open the door for mandating that proposed bombing targets be afforded notice
and a hearing. 542 U.S. 507, 597–99 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). This narrow ex ante
methodology circumvents this problem while still providing a necessary additional layer of
process.
271. See supra Part II.B.
272. See supra notes 199, 203–04.
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imminency of harm posed by an American citizen.273 This system of
preemptive review significantly reduces the risk of an erroneous deprivation
and, in doing so, greatly diminishes the likelihood that a citizen’s procedural
due process rights would be infringed under the Mathews test.
CONCLUSION
The executive’s harsh unilateral treatment of an American citizen’s most
valuable private interest in the DOJ White Memo coupled with the
recognition of a plausible due process claim incapable of redress in Aulaqi II
scream for reform. The high risk of erroneous deprivation inherent in the
executive’s current methodology should be offset by allocating power to the
federal branch most qualified to assess constitutional rights—the judiciary.
The narrowly tailored ex ante judicial regime described above provides a
much-needed system of independent review that allows the executive to carry
out its vital mission of safeguarding our nation while still providing adequate
procedural due process for U.S. citizens. Although little can be done to
remedy past transgressions, hope remains for the next Aulaqi—there is still
time to mitigate the slippery slope toward executive despotism so feared by
the Framers of our Constitution. As Justice O’Connor masterfully
articulated: “It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that
our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in
those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles
for which we fight abroad.”274 It would be of the highest shame if, cloaked
under the banner of national security, we lost sight of the values that make
our nation worth defending.

273. See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text.
274. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532.

